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“The ASEAN Regional Forum and Security Governance in Asia-Pacific” 
 
In the aftermath of WWII, and once again at the end of the Cold War, Europeans 
created order and thereby assured their stability.  As previously shown (Weber and 
Huang 2008), they did so by transcending historical legacies, but also by including 
former enemies into security structures, tying the US to the European continent and thus, 
over time, promoting principles, norms and rules that built trust and redefined identities.  
Or, put differently, Europeans promoted peace and stability by giving rise to what 
Webber et. al. (2004), Kirchner (2006), and Kirchner and Sperling (2007) characterize as 
“security governance.”  
Security provisions in the Asia-Pacific region look very different.  History there is 
still divisive, and a “hub and spokes network” consisting of five bilateral alliances 
(between the US and Australia, Japan, South Korea, the Philippines and Thailand), along 
with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and, more recently, the 
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), were created to stabilize the region.  
Making use of the concept of security governance and the four security functions 
(prevention, assurance, protection and compellence) developed by Kirchner and Sperling 
(2007), this paper shows that the ARF, for the most part, has worked to bring about 
Confidence Building Mechanisms (CBM)s.  Although it recently has begun to transition 
to Preventive Diplomacy (PD), has attempted to give some assurance via the 
dissemination of ASEAN norms, and made some progress in the area of protection 
(especially with respect to counter-terrorism measures), the ARF lacks any means for 
compellence and thus has to make important changes to move beyond the image of a 
“talk-shop” or “paper tiger.”   3 
  In the following, I first sketch security provisions in Asia-Pacific following World 
War II and take a look at ASEAN to set the stage for a closer examination of the ASEAN 
Regional Forum.  I then discuss the rationale for the creation of the ARF, its institutional 
framework, fundamental principles, and decision-making, and examine the organization’s 
main developments with respect to the four security functions (prevention, assurance, 
protection and compellence) developed by Kirchner and Sperling (2007).  In the 
concluding section, I assess the ARF’s effectiveness and discuss its future prospects.  
 
Security Provisions in the Asia-Pacific Region in the Aftermath of World War II  
 
  When the US defeated Japan in 1945, China, Korea, and Southeast Asia were 
liberated from Japanese rule.  Whereas the Europeans relied on multiple institutional 
arrangements with varying degrees of commitment to assure their security, in Asia-
Pacific bilateralism (Cha 2003: 108) trumped all other security provisions.  Australia, 
Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand all relied predominately on the 
American “hub and spokes network” to deal with external threats.
1  
  Yet, since the Southeast Asian countries, following World War II, quickly became 
part of the Cold War struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union, and “a 
battleground in the conflict between China and the Soviet Union” (Narine 2002: 10), the 
Southeast Asian countries sought further security guarantees.  The perception of external 
threat, therefore, was an essential component in the promotion of regionalism in 
Southeast Asia, along-side concerns regarding intra-regional predators and internal 
communist insurgencies.  
Given the great uncertainty surrounding the behavior of the USSR and China in 
the aftermath of the Second World War, the US took a first step to promote regionalism   4 
in Southeast Asia.  In 1954, together with France, Great Britain, New Zealand, Australia, 
the Philippines, Thailand and Pakistan, the US founded the Southeast Asia Treaty 
Organization (SEATO) to prevent communism from gaining ground in the region.  
However since, “[u]nlike NATO, SEATO had no independent mechanism for obtaining 
intelligence or deploying military forces, [its] … potential for collective action was 
necessarily limited.”
2  SEATO held annual joint military exercises and engaged in 
consultation, but suffered from a lack of “credibility” and therefore was disbanded in 
1977.  Another attempt at promoting regional order was made by the South Korean 
president Park Chung-hee with the creation of the Asian Pacific Council (ASPAC) in 
1966, but this grouping of anti-communist states disintegrated in 1972. 
The next two efforts to establish order were made exclusively by Southeast Asian 
countries without any outside help.  In 1961 Malaya, the Philippines and Thailand gave 
rise to the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA).  Whereas Malaya and the Philippines 
preferred an arrangement with significant institutional structures, Thailand favored a 
much less binding commitment and eventually got its way.  The ASA ran into trouble 
when the Philippines decided to lay claim on Sabah (territory which the British had 
intended to include in the proposed Federation of Malaysia).  This dispute between the 
Philippines and what then became known as Malaysia (an amalgamation of Malaya, 
Singapore, Sabah and Sarawak) rendered the ASA ineffective for the following years.     
MAPHILINDO (a grouping of Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia) was 
founded in 1963, but was weakened significantly shortly after it had come about, due to 
the creation of the Federation of Malaysia which neither Indonesia nor the Philippines 
recognized (Narine 2002: 10-12).  Between 1963 and 1966, President Sukarno of   5 
Indonesia then pursued konfrontasi--a policy of confrontation and regional disruption--
with Malaysia and Singapore, once the latter had been expelled from Malaysia in 1965.  
The idea was to destabilize Malaysia through limited military action, economic sanctions 
and propaganda.  Konfrontasi finally ended when Sukarno was deposed by the military in 
1966.   
Even though both the ASA and MAPHILINDO collapsed, due to the above 
described internal hostilities, they were important precursors of ASEAN (Frost 1990: 4).  
The disputes between these countries made the need for regional cooperation abundantly 
clear and, ultimately, led to new discussions which on August 8, 1967, gave rise to 
ASEAN.   
    
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)    
By founding ASEAN, Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, and the 
Philippines hoped to accomplish three main objectives.  First, they sought to reduce 
tensions and competition among themselves, i.e., Southeast Asia’s non-communist states.  
Second, they hoped that by promoting domestic socio-economic development, it would 
be easier for them to tackle internal communist challenges and/or deal with externally 
sponsored communist insurgencies.  Third, they sought to reduce the regional military 
influence of external actors by expressly stating that foreign military bases in the region 
should be temporary (Narine 2002: 13).  Since most of the ASEAN states are still “deeply 
engaged in the process of state-building,…their most important concern is to maintain 
and promote their rights and security as sovereign states” (ibid. p. 3).  Or, put differently, 
when it comes to ranking norms, sovereignty wins out over all others.   6 
Mindful not to provoke other countries in the region, like Vietnam, but also 
unable to see eye-to-eye on security matters, and lacking the military means to bring 
about a credible security apparatus, the ASEAN members carefully spelled out in the 
Bangkok Declaration that their main goals shall be: “to accelerate the economic growth, 
social progress, and cultural development in the region through joint endeavours in the 
spirit of equality and partnership…[and] to promote regional peace and stability.”
3  But, 
much like in the case of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), “security 
concerns and political purposes were never far from the ASEAN founders’ intentions.”
4  
As the Corregidor Affair in 1968 proves, ASEAN was off to a rough start.  
Allegations that the Philippines were using the island to train Muslim insurgents to 
infiltrate Sabah led to a diplomatic row between Malaysia and the Philippines and, 
eventually, to the cancellation of ASEAN meetings.  Only when changes in their external 
environment (Britain’s announcement that it would accelerate its withdrawal from 
Southeast Asia; Nixon’s claim that the US would limit its involvement in Southeast Asia; 
the intensification of the Sino-Soviet conflict; the spread of war from Vietnam to Laos 
and Cambodia) drove home the need for renewed cooperation, did Malaysia and the 
Philippines resume normal relations in December 1969 (Narine 2002: 19).  
Recognizing that it would be difficult to attain domestic stability and socio-
economic development as long as external powers would be able to intervene in their 
affairs, on November 26-27, 1971, the foreign ministers of ASEAN met in Kuala Lumpur 
and signed a Declaration of a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) in 
Southeast Asia.  The purpose of this political statement of intent was to neutralize 
Southeast Asia and the signatories envisioned a two-pronged strategy to get there.  First,   7 
the Southeast Asian states should support non-aggression principles and respect each 
others’ sovereignty and territorial integrity.  And, secondly, the major powers (the US, 
the USSR, and China) should guarantee Southeast Asia’s neutrality and assure that the 
region would not become an area of conflict between them.  
The collapse of anticommunist regimes in South Vietnam and Cambodia in 1975 
hit home the need for economic development to counter the internal appeal of 
communism in ASEAN countries.  To improve ASEAN’s internal stability, the ASEAN 
heads of state met in Bali in February 1976 and reached two crucial agreements, the 
Declaration of ASEAN Concord and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast 
Asia (TAC).  Whereas the former, largely, defined areas of economic cooperation (with 
respect to basic commodities; large-scale industrial projects; intraregional trade 
liberalization; joint approaches to world economic problems) and suggested annual 
summits of ASEAN’s economic ministers, the latter focused on security issues obliging 
the member states to settle their disputes peacefully through consultation.  TAC, as 
Narine (2002: 23) explains, served as ASEAN’s “code of conduct,” spelling out its 
fundamental principles which will be examined in more detail below, and as a non-
aggression pact. 
To mention but one further security provision, at the Bangkok Summit in 
December 1995 the leaders of the ASEAN countries signed the Treaty on the Southeast 
Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ).  With this treaty, which came into force 
on 27 March 1997, the signatories declared their determination to “take concrete action 
which will contribute to the progress towards general and complete disarmament of 
nuclear weapons, and to the promotion of international peace and security.”
5   8 
A series of basic documents, thus, make up ASEAN’s legal framework.  Whereas 
the Bangkok Declaration (1967) spells out the organization’s aims, the Kuala Lumpur 
Declaration (1971) prescribes non-interference by outside powers via ZOPFAN.  The 
Bali Declaration (1976) then stipulates further cooperation in the economic, social, 
cultural and political fields, but, most importantly, codifies ASEAN’s fundamental 
principles in Chapter I, Article 2 of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast 
Asia (TAC) as:   
“mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity, and 
national identity of all nations; the right of every State to lead its national existence free 
from external interference, subversion or coercion; non-interference in the internal affairs 
of one another; settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful manner; renunciation of 
the threat or use of force; and effective cooperation among themselves.”
6 
 
Among legal commitments sovereign equality is paramount and therefore members’ 
rights as sovereign states need to be respected at all times.  In the event that conflict 
should occur, TAC stresses in Chapter IV, it needs to be resolved in a non-
confrontational way. 
Other legally-binding basic documents deal with economic cooperation 
(Agreement on the Common Effective Preferential Tariff [CEPT] Scheme for the 
ASEAN Free Trade Area, Singapore, 28 January 1992; Protocol to Amend the 
Framework Agreement on Enhancing ASEAN Economic Cooperation, Bangkok, 15 
December 1995), security issues (Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free 
Zone, Bangkok, 15 December 1995; Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South 
China Sea 2002), and the future of regional cooperation (ASEAN Vision 2020 [1997]).
7  
What sets the organization apart from many other regional institutions is its own 
process of decision-making, typically referred to as the “ASEAN Way.”  Based on the   9 
Malay cultural practices of musjawarah and mufukat, the idea is to reach agreement via 
consultation and consensus, respectively (Narine 2002: 31).  Should there be obstacles in 
the way that may prevent cooperation in a particular issue area, ASEAN members should 
be willing to move issues aside and proceed with consultation in another area.  By 
holding its members to a specific code of conduct, the organization seeks to contain 
problems and, over time, build a regional consciousness, if not regional identity.  
Due to its unwillingness to sacrifice sovereignty, ASEAN has retained a clear 
preference for informal mechanisms over legalistic institutions.  In fact, it outright rejects 
any form of supra-national decision-making and, if need be, is prepared to settle for 
lowest common denominator decisions. 
 
Security Provisions in the Asia-Pacific Region Following the End of the Cold War 
 
As discussed above, ASEAN started out with five founding members: Indonesia, 
Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines.  Brunei was added in 1984.  For 
political, economic and security reasons ASEAN then brought the mainland Southeast 
Asian states on board (Vietnam joined ASEAN in 1995; Myanmar and Laos in 1997; and 
Cambodia in 1999), thinking that it should seize the window of opportunity which the 
end of the Cold War had opened.  The members hoped that an ASEAN of ten countries 
would have a more substantial voice in international economic and security discussions, 
that the organization would be in a better position to compete with great powers in the 
region like China, Japan, and India, that it would have greater economic appeal, and be in 
a better position to promote peace and stability (Narine 2002: 113).  
Although security considerations played a crucial role in the founding of ASEAN 
it refused to present itself as security bloc.  Instead, via ZOPFAN, ASEAN pursued an   10 
isolationist foreign policy and the Philippines and Thailand relied predominately on their 
bilateral alliances with the US to protect themselves against external threats.  In the late 
1980s and 1990s, numerous bilateral military arrangements between ASEAN members 
also began to flourish and they engaged in joint military exercises (Narine 2002: 71).  At 
the same time, an arms buildup took place to be able to deal with unresolved disputes.  
For instance, during the 1990s, disputes occurred over fishing and illegal Thai 
immigrants to Malaysia.  Moreover, Indonesia and Malaysia engaged in a dispute over 
the islands of Ligitan and Sipidan, and there were ethnic tensions between Singapore and 
Malaysia (Narine 2002: 73). 
In addition to facing intra-regional challenges, in the post-Cold War era, ASEAN 
countries are confronted with new transnational challenges (terrorism, the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction, energy security, maritime security, etc.), greater uncertainty 
regarding the behavior of the Great Powers in the region, and the fear of US isolationism.  
These changed circumstances necessitated a reassessment of existing security provisions 
and made clear that ASEAN needed to be adapted.  Since, in this post-Cold War 
environment in which shifts in the regional balance of power are externally driven, 
ASEAN can no longer insulate the region from outside influence, it needs to find new 
ways to constrain others through dialogue and consultation (Acharya, 2003: 149).  And 
that is precisely what ASEAN did with the issuance of the Manila Declaration.   
Fearing conflict with China over the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea (which are of 
both strategic and economic value), in 1992, the organization sought to diffuse a volatile 
situation by calling for a peaceful settlement of disputes in the region.  As point 5 of the 
Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea states: “The Parties   11 
undertake to exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that would complicate or 
escalate disputes and affect peace and stability including, among others, refraining from 
action of inhabiting the presently uninhabited islands, reefs, shoals, cays, and other 
features and to handle their differences in a constructive manner.”
8    
As will be seen below, ASEAN also decided to expand its focus by giving rise to 
a new multilateral arrangement--the ASEAN Regional Forum--to deal with external as 
well as internal threats.  But it is important to understand that, as long as the close 
military dependence on the Western powers remains, ”no ASEAN country sees regional 
military cooperation as a substitute for security links with external powers” (Acharya 
2003: 119), merely as an additional safety device meant to reduce the region’s 
dependence on the West over time.  
A regional security conference was first mentioned by Gorbachev in 1986.  The 
idea was then picked up by Australian foreign minister, Gareth Evans, who proposed a 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Asia (CSCA) modeled after the Conference 
on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).  ASEAN members initially rejected this 
idea but were open to using ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conferences for further security 
discussions (Narine 2002: 103). 
 
Rationale for the Creation of the ASEAN Regional Forum, Main Objectives and 
Goals 
 
  It was clear from the outset that ASEAN sought to complement the hub-and-
spokes networks by using its own model of cooperative security as a framework for 
promoting peace.  “Its underlying goal,” as Leifner (1996:19) put it, “was to create the 
conditions for a stable …distribution of power among the three major Asia-Pacific states-  12 
-China, Japan and the United States--that would benefit regional order.”  After careful 
deliberations the Twenty-Sixth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting and Post Ministerial 
Conference, in July 1993, agreed to create the ASEAN Regional Forum.  
The inaugural meeting of the ARF was held one year later in Bangkok on 25 July 
1994.  From its outset its founders conceptualized the organization as the principal forum 
for security cooperation in the region.  Comprised of 27 countries,
9 the ARF is based on 
ASEAN-style diplomacy (non-interference in the internal affairs of states, non-use of 
force, pacific settlement of disputes, consensus decision making, a preference for non-
binding and non-legalistic approaches) and displays minimal institutionalization, thus 
setting it apart from European security structures.  
As Katsumata (2006: 194) explains, the “ARF is not designed to ‘resolve’… 
disputes--i.e., to reach a formal agreement, or to create a formal mechanism to regulate 
concerned states’ actions.”  It therefore could not prevent a number of conflicts between 
its members such as disputes between India and Pakistan, the diplomatic row between 
South Korea and Japan over Dokdo/Takeshima, China’s military intimidation in the 
Taiwan Strait, territorial disputes regarding the Spratlys or the South China Sea, to name 
but a few.    
Rather than to settle disputes, the ARF seeks to promote lasting peace by utilizing 
CBMs that are to create trust among its members.  Or, in other words, the ARF is about 
“identity-building” and its members hope that…”dialogue should lead to socialization 
which, in turn, will lead to the dissipation of conflicts of interests” (Garofano 1999: 78).  
Comprehensive engagement and political dialogue, from the ARF’s perspective, are the 
correct way to foster peace, not the dispatch of troops and carrier battle groups (Leifner   13 
1996: 46).  Thus for the first ten years of its existence the ARF largely held workshops 
with the main purpose of disseminating the “ASEAN way” (non-use of force, non-
interference in domestic affairs, etc.), thereby earning the label of a “norm brewery” 
(Katsumata 2006: 195). 
   
The ARF’s Institutional Framework, Principles, and Decision-Making 
The “ARF’s highest level [of interaction] is the annual foreign minister’s meeting, 
always chaired by the ASEAN country occupying the rotating chairmanship” (Simon 
2008: 279).  This meeting is supported by an annual Senior Officers Meeting (SOM).  
Members of the ARF, additionally, have agreed to set up two structures to help the ARF-
SOM Chairman: an Inter-Sessional Support Group (ISG) on Confidence Building “to 
address…a dialogue on security perceptions and defence policy papers,” and Inter-
Sessional Meetings (ISMs) “to deal with cooperative activities, including peacekeeping 
and search-and-rescue coordination” (Leifner 1996: 42).  These groups are supplemented 
by specialists who meet in Track II meetings like the Northeast Asia Cooperation 
Dialogue (NEACD) founded in 1993 or the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia 
Pacific (CSCAP) founded in 1994.
10  Or, put differently, the ASEAN Regional Forum 
engages in both “first track” (official) and “second track” (unofficial) diplomacy.  The 
former typically entails discussions by Foreign Ministers, whereas scholars, members of 
Think Tanks, government representatives not acting in their official capacity, as well as 
other individuals and organizations attend “second track” meetings on regional security 
issues.    14 
In their efforts to promote peace, the ASEAN members of the ARF seek to retain 
control over the organization.  They do this by making sure that ASEAN states provide 
the venue for the ARF’s annual meetings.  Moreover, they insist that intersession study 
groups, which are composed of two states, always include an ASEAN member.  And, 
they mandate that the ASEAN consensus principle always prevails (Simon 2007: 22). 
  Very much like in the case of ASEAN, the bottom line for the ARF is to protect 
the sovereignty of its members and to uphold the fundamental principles outlined in the 
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation.  What needs to be understood about the ARF, 
however, is that it is split between activist (Australia, Canada, US, Japan) and reluctant 
(China and most of ASEAN) countries.  ASEAN countries reject a more formal ARF 
because they want to avoid taking any steps that would undermine the ASEAN way.  
China, similarly, rejects greater formality because it opposes interference in its domestic 
affairs (particularly when it comes to Taiwan and the South China Sea).  Hence a “pace 
comfortable to all participants” needs to be found, which, as will be seen below, often 
undermines the effectiveness of the ARF as a regional security actor by leading to lowest 
common denominator decisions.  
 
Main Developments and Institutional Innovation 
  In their 1995 Concept Paper the ARF members envisioned a “three-stage, 
evolutionary approach” …”moving from confidence building to preventive diplomacy 
and, in the long term, towards a conflict resolution capability.”
11  Thus far, the ARF has 
largely made progress in the area of confidence building.  Since it took the organization 
until 2005 to declare that it was time to move into the preventive diplomacy stage, efforts   15 
to develop PD mechanisms (which according to the ARF Concept Paper would be “a 
natural follow-up” to CBMs) and protection, not to speak of conflict management 
measures (such as assurance and compellence), are still at an embryonic stage.   
As expressly stated in the Co-Chair’s Summary Report of the ARF Workshop on 
“Confidence Building Measures and Preventive Diplomacy in Asia and Europe” (Berlin, 
12-14 March 2008), the ARF is “currently in the transition phase from confidence 
building to preventive diplomacy.”
12  The document explains that “[a]s mutual trust 
amongst ASEAN countries…and ARF participants had increased, the ARF was in a good 
position to advance into preventive diplomacy.”
13  Since the time has come to translate 
commitment into action, Mr. Wong Chow Ming, Deputy-Director at the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of Singapore, proposed to…”enhance concrete practical cooperation; 
streamline decision-making; strengthen [the] ARF Chair…maintain [a] ‘flexible 
moratorium’ on membership and enhance cooperation with Track II and external 
organizations.”
14  Other steps to enhance CBMs and PD might include the improvement 
of communication between ARF participants, information exchange mechanisms, and the 
creation of a crisis room or some other form of early warning mechanism.
15 
Before taking a closer look at the ARF’s preventive diplomacy measures, it needs 
to be stressed that preventive diplomacy is not synonymous with preventive action.  
Whereas the former assumes that diplomatic measures will suffice to prevent conflict, the 
latter may entail military deployment, peace-making and/or peace-keeping, that is, efforts 
to cure a problem after conflict has already erupted (Tay with Talib 1997: 254).  Put 
differently, preventive diplomacy consists of three main goals: (1) to prevent disputes 
from arising between parties; (2) to prevent existing disputes from escalating into   16 
conflicts; and (3) to limit the spread of conflicts when they occur (ibid.).  PD makes use 
of persuasion rather than coercion and includes such tools as negotiation, mediation and 
conciliation.  Given the non-coercive nature of PD--“consensual, diplomatic and political 
action taken by sovereign states with the consent of all directly involved parties”--
16 
sanctions, military deployment, the use of force, or the threat of the use of any of these 
measures are excluded. 
Preventive diplomacy measures, as envisioned by the ARF, can be taken before a 
crisis and/or during its onset.  Pre-crisis measures include information exchanges on 
military exercises and weapons purchases; greater transparency via Defense White 
Papers; institution-building for consultation and exchange of personnel; norm-building; 
early warning systems to detect the build-up of military forces, natural disasters, refugee 
movements, famine, etc.
17  PD measures at the onset of a crisis, on the other hand, consist 
of fact finding; goodwill missions by envoys to express concern about a particular 
situation; mediation or the good offices of a third party to restore order (ibid). 
  From September 4-7 2007, for instance, an ARF Disaster Relief Desk-top 
Exercise was held in Darwin to develop an initial structure for ARF Standard Operating 
Procedures (SOPs) for Disaster Relief and Humanitarian Assistance.  This was followed 
one month later by an ARF Inter-Sessional Meeting on Disaster Relief in Helsinki were  
recommendations were made regarding the development of strategies and a procedure for 
enhanced inter-governmental cooperation in this area.  Specifically, ARF members 
discussed the improvement of military-to-military and civilian-military coordination, 
including joint training and better information sharing in the pre-deployment and actual   17 
response phases.
18  The meeting also stressed that the ARF data base should complement 
existing UN mechanisms.   
  The ARF conducted a further Desktop Exercise on Disaster Relief in Jakarta, 1-2 
May 2008, and pronounced it an important milestone in the organization’s move from 
confidence building mechanisms to preventive diplomacy.  At the same time, however, 
the Co-Chair’s Summary Report of the ARF Desktop Exercise emphasized that the ARF 
Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Standard Operating Procedures (HADR 
SOP) must acknowledge the primacy of sovereignty and therefore are non-binding, that 
is, external assistance shall only be provided with the consent of the affected country.
19 
  In the area of energy security the ARF has also taken steps recently to promote 
greater cooperation and prevent conflict.  During their 2
nd Seminar on Energy Security 
15-17 April 2008 in Singapore ARF members, first of all, defined what security in this 
area means to them.  In their summary statement they made clear that they prefer a broad 
view that “includes not only energy diversification…, but also energy diplomacy, energy 
conservation, infrastructural challenges, environmental protection, and the development 
of alternative and renewable sources of energy.”
20  Moreover, they noted that greater 
regional cooperation would be essential to assure the security of transit routes, and 
recommended several concrete steps to enhance energy security such as “information 
exchange and assistance on best practices; scenario planning exercises; and enhanced 
cooperation regarding the development and investment in new infrastructure” (ibid.). 
  This past year there have also been signs that the ARF may soon be ready to set 
itself more ambitious goals and consider undertaking preventive actions in addition to 
preventive diplomacy.  During its 2
nd Peacekeeping Experts’ Meeting in Singapore 4-6   18 
March 2008, the organization discussed the possibility of future participation in 
peacekeeping operations and called for “enhanced quality in training, the right equipment 
and the necessary political will.”
21  The Japanese government, moreover, offered 
cooperation with peacekeeping training centers in the Asian region.  Those countries not 
ready to contribute forces, it was noted, could aid in other ways by providing health and 
medical services, military advisers and combat service support forces (ibid.).  
Additionally, it was suggested that “future meetings could look at an integrated or 
comprehensive mission concept”…and consider “holding a peacekeeping planning 
exercise/activity in the future” (ibid. p.8). 
  When it comes to assurance, both ASEAN and the ARF seek to disseminate the 
norms associated with the ASEAN way, but there is no evidence of post-conflict 
reconstruction or peace-building found in the European theater.  As can be seen in the 
Co-Chair’s Report of the Meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum Inter-Sessional 
Support Group on Confidence Building Measures and Preventive Diplomacy in Ottawa, 
Canada, 3-4 April 2008, a number of participants expressed their deep concern about the 
situation in Myanmar and called for the release of all political prisoners.
22  They also 
urged Myanmar to make “meaningful and expeditious progress towards democratic 
reform and national reconciliation.”
23  But the ARF goes no further than that and stays 
clear of policing missions, dispatching humanitarian assistance, etc.   
  In the area of protection, only modest progress has been made so far, due to the 
norm of non-interference and ARF members’ hesitancy to curtail their autonomy.  The 
ARF recognizes the need to protect society from threats caused by organized crime,   19 
terrorism, the spread of infectious diseases, environmental degradation etc., but to date, 
has not moved much beyond the discussion stage.  
  During a Roundtable on Maritime Security held in August 2007, for instance, 
ARF members declared that maritime security must be strengthened particularly with 
respect to surveillance and the sharing of best practices.  They were also in agreement 
regarding the main threats in this area: piracy, armed robberies, over-lapping claims and 
territorial disputes, terrorism, environmental degradation, and the smuggling of goods 
and persons.
24  To improve maritime security, Roundtable participants concluded, the 
ARF should move from discussion to the implementation of concrete measures, but 
without losing sight of the ARF principles.   
  Similar hesitancy can be observed in the area of defense cooperation.  Even 
though, as the Report of the ASEAN Regional Forum Defense Dialogue 7 May 2008 in 
Singapore makes clear, interactions and engagements in this area have allowed the ARF 
to “move towards greater practical cooperation,…the need for capacity building through 
joint training and information sharing” still exists.
25  The Chairman’s Summary Report of 
the 5
th ARF Security Policy Conference the following day, therefore, highlighted the 
“importance to move beyond dialogues to forge practical cooperation in areas of common 
interest” and gave particular mention to “disaster preparedness and emergency response” 
(ibid. p.3).  
  In recent years, the ARF has made some progress regarding counter-terrorism.  
The organization recognizes that terrorism “constitutes a grave threat to stability, peace 
and security in the Asia-Pacific and beyond” and thus, repeatedly, has called upon its 
members to become parties to int’l conventions and protocols relating to terrorism.
26   20 
During the Sixth ASEAN Regional Forum Inter-Sessional Meeting on Counter-Terrorism 
and Transnational Crime in Semarang, Indonesia, 21-22 February 2008, for example, the 
need for cooperation in the area of counter-terrorism among regional organizations like 
ASEAN, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) 
and the ARF was stressed to ensure maximum synergies and avoid duplication.  
Participants also “supported in principle” the proposal by the Republic of Korea to 
“explore practical and concrete ways” to implement previous ARF recommendations in 
“fighting cyber attack and terrorist misuse of cyber space.”
27  The meeting, moreover, 
discussed strategies to counter transnational crime, improve boundary control, and better 
deal with cross border crime through close cooperation between the authorities and the 
public.  Finally, the meeting addressed measures like bilateral agreements, intelligence 
exchanges, information sharing, law enforcement cooperation, and mutual legal 
assistance to fight transnational crime more effectively.
28  As has been seen in the area of 
prevention and assurance, however, the bottom line for ARF members in the area of 
protection largely is that proposals need further reflection, since they would lead to the 
creation of permanent mechanisms that could undermine the “ASEAN way.”  This 
explains why, at the moment, no institutional structure exists in the region that would 
come anywhere near an Asian version of Europol. 
  Since the “prime model for the ARF is ASEAN’s own distinctive, political 
approach to regional security problems,” as Leifer (1996: 3) aptly put it, “conspicuously 
absent from the ARF is any robust provision for addressing the use of force in conflict 
and conflict resolution.”  Hence with respect to compellence, no action presently exists.       21 
Military intervention, peace-making, peace-enforcement or any other military instruments 
are clearly outside the purview of the ARF which consciously elects to rely exclusively 
on political and economic means.  This lack of “teeth,” according to Leifner (1996: 53), 
renders the ARF an “imperfect diplomatic instrument for achieving regional security 
goals.” 
 
The Effectiveness of the ARF as a Security Actor and Future Prospects 
 
  The lack of measures to compel others to engage in certain types of behavior may 
make the ARF imperfect, but does it also make it ineffective?  “Despite being labeled a 
‘talk shop,’” Acharya (2003: 332) points out that the ARF ”fulfills the expected function 
of institutions in lowering transaction costs, providing information and preventing 
cheating.”  The ARF clearly has promoted regional stability via the creation of CBMs 
and numerous venues for the exchange of ideas and building of trust.  Japan, for instance, 
views the organization as a “vehicle for enhancing [the] overall diplomatic climate 
between regional countries and as an important element of its policy of engagement with 
China and North Korea” (Yuzawa 2007: 177).  The Japanese know that many of their 
neighbors are still distrustful and the ARF provides a welcome setting for reassurances.  
Similarly, as China’s military and economic power grows, it increasingly has an interest 
in signaling its peaceful intentions and interacting with its neighbors in a multilateral 
institutional setting.  And even though China, when it first joined the ARF, was 
concerned that the US and Japan might gang up on it, it quickly concluded that staying 
out was too risky and therefore not an option (ibid. 32).   22 
Much like Acharya (2003: 170) has found in the case of ASEAN, it can be argued 
that “persisting bilateral tensions, territorial disputes, [and] militarization” also 
undermine the ARF’s effectiveness as a viable regional security provider.  What one 
continues to see is a gradual, piecemeal approach to cooperation where the norm of non-
interference, the consensus principle, the lack of institutionalization, and the absence of 
interoperability constrain policy options, and where undesirable behavior by a member, 
for the most part, still goes unpunished. 
To enhance security in the region, and assure that countries like Japan and the US 
will not lose interest in the ARF, “tangible progress” has to be made, particularly with 
respect to the non-interference principle (Yusawa 2007: 170, and 2006: 804).  So long as 
states have either asked for or consented to intervention by the ARF, Japan for instance 
thinks, the organization should be allowed to play a role in intrastate conflict.  In such 
cases, as long as preventive diplomacy measures were to be authorized by the states 
involved, their use would neither violate state sovereignty nor the principle of non-
interference in the domestic affairs of others (Yuzawa 2006: 790).  Put differently, 
activist ARF members like Australia, the US, Canada, and Japan think it is important to 
depart from the rules that characterize the “ASEAN Way” in order for the organization to 
develop more meaningful PD mechanisms.  Even at that, in the eyes of Yuzawa (2006: 
786), such a departure “would only be a prerequisite, not a solution.”  
The ARF also needs to rethink the consensus principle which often gets in the 
way of joint agreements.  This obstacle, according to Simon (2007: 25), could be dealt 
with if ARF members were willing to adopt an ASEAN procedure known as the 
“ASEAN Minus X” understanding.  The latter essentially allows for a “coalition of the   23 
willing,” and thus, much like in the European theater, makes it possible to progress in 
situations where not everyone is able/willing to move at the same speed.  Since 
inclusivity can hinder progress, it sometimes may be better to seek cooperation among a 
smaller number of players to reach agreement rather than trying to get everyone on board 
(Garofano 1999: 84).  Such a move, however, can be expected to be rejected by more 
reluctant ARF members like China and most of ASEAN.  
  Additionally, there is a need for greater institutionalization.  Since an early 
warning system, for example, requires a mechanism to collect data, either a permanent 
secretariat or something like a Regional Risk Reduction Center will have to be put in 
place to make concrete progress in this area (Yuzawa 2006: 801).  At the same time,  
even though some ASEAN members and China have been hesitant to give greater powers 
to the ARF Chair, it seems to make sense to create a triumvirate--comprised of present, 
immediate past and prospective chairmen (Tay with Talib 1997: 264)--as found in the EU 
Commission to assure some continuity and promote institutional learning.  
  Further undermining the ARF’s effectiveness is the absence of interoperability 
and, to date, pretty much an unwillingness or inability to set up effective arrangements to 
cope with transnational challenges (Simon 2007: 30).  As discussed above, there has been 
significant progress with respect to confidence-building measures, but much fewer 
tangible results can be seen in the area of PD, assurance and protection.   
  But, as alluded to above, the real Achilles heel of the ARF is its lack of 
enforcement mechanisms or sanctions.  As is, the organization has no way to punish 
members who choose not to comply with its norms and rules.  In the case of North Korea, 
for instance, ARF members so far have done no more than express their concern over the   24 
DPRK’s failure to meet the requirements for a declaration of its nuclear programs and 
repeatedly called for progress in the Six-Party talks.  Similarly, during the recent unrest in 
Myanmar, ARF members essentially did no more than voice their concern and urge the 
government to promote peaceful change and reconciliation.  To become more effective in 
situations like the ones described above, the organization would have to develop 
contingency-planning against any members within the grouping, come up with formal 
and/or informal dispute settlement mechanisms, or try to resolve conflicts via 
compromise (Garofano 1999: 84-89). 
 
Prospects 
 
Given the history of the region, countries in Asia-Pacific are sensitive to 
infringements on their sovereignty and, rather than to curtail their freedom of action, 
prefer to begin by building mutual trust, respect, and tolerance through regular talks and 
then graduate to more ambitious goals.  “[C]onfidence-building measures, preventive 
diplomacy and conflict resolution,” according to Lee (1997: 262), are the bottom line, 
and multilateral institutions, by “redefin[ing] identities and acceptable standards of 
behavior” (Katzenstein and Okawara 2004: 120), and promoting greater transparency, are 
a good way of getting there.    
  Institutions like ASEAN, the ARF and CSCAP, clearly, are vital when it comes to 
community building and their members hope that by engaging each other they can 
promote understanding, avoid problems from spiraling out of control, and over time 
create more sophisticated security structures that can cope with bigger problems.  The 
idea is to acquire information and then, gradually, change interests and preferences.  Or,   25 
as Johnston and Evans (1999: 264) put it, “the most important function of dialogue fora is 
not the rules they create but the suspicions they allay and the norms they reinforce.”  
  Strategic instability does exist in Asia-Pacific and, as the Six Party talks most 
recently have shown, the countries in the region, much like the Europeans in the 
aftermath of World War II, slowly seem to understand that it is in their interest to include 
their most likely adversaries in cooperative security structures, rather than to ally against 
them.  What specific form cooperative security arrangements in the region will take in the 
not too distant future is still to be determined.  
  The ARF, as Buzan and Weaver (2003: 158) correctly point out, “binds both 
Japan and China into a regional institutional framework, allowing Japan to address its 
historical problem, China to address fears of its neighbors, and both to avoid conspicuous 
balancing behavior towards each other.”  By virtue of its highly specific nature, however,   
the ASEAN Way may not be the best solution for the wider Asia-Pacific region (Acharya 
2003: 12; and Bisley 2007/08: 352).    26 
Table 1.  Rationale for Collective Action  
  Assurance  Prevention  Protection  Compellence 
Rationale 
for 
collective 
action 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Disseminate 
norms & rules 
to promote 
peace 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Complement 
“hub & 
spokes” 
network 
 
Emergence of 
regional 
identity 
 
 
 
Confront new 
transnational 
challenges (terrorism, 
proliferation of WMD, 
energy security, 
maritime security) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.  Principles of action 
  Assurance  Prevention  Protection  Compellence 
Principles of 
action 
Non-interference in 
internal affairs 
 
Consensus 
Dissemination of 
norms & rules 
 
Consensus 
Sovereignty 
 
Consensus 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.  Policy challenges and goals 
  Assurance  Prevention  Protection  Compellence 
Principal 
policy 
challenges 
Intra-state 
conflict 
resolution 
State- & nation-
building 
Create conditions 
for stable 
distribution of 
power among 
China, Japan, & US 
 
Institution-building 
within ASEAN 
 
Principal 
policy goals 
Supporting 
regional stability 
via support for 
“ASEAN way” 
 
 
Address root 
causes of 
instability via 
CMBs and PD 
 
Regional 
integration 
Increased police & 
judicial cooperation 
 
Border security 
 
Health security 
Conflict 
resolution 
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Table 4:  Institutional evolution of the ARF as a security actor  
 
  Assurance  Prevention  Protection  Compellence 
Major institutional 
innovations 
  ISG on Confidence 
Building 
 
ISM on 
Peacekeeping 
 
 
Maritime Security 
Roundtable 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5:  The ARF’s Performance as a Security Actor 
  Assurance  Prevention  Protection  Compellence 
Major 
policy 
initiatives  
Expressed 
concern 
regarding 
Myanmar; 
urged reforms 
& release of 
political 
prisoners 
 
 
ARF Disaster 
Relief Desktop 
Exercise 
 
Peacekeeping 
Expert Meeting 
 
Regional Risk 
Reduction 
Center 
(proposed) 
Maritime Security 
Roundtable in 
agreement on main 
threats 
 
“Support in principle” 
recommendations to 
fight cyber attack & 
terrorist misuse of 
cyber space 
  
 
 
 
Table 6.  Assessment of the ARF as a security actor  
  Assurance  Prevention  Protection  Compellence 
Degree of  
Policy 
effectiveness 
Myanmar: no 
evidence of post-
conflict 
reconstruction or 
peacekeeping 
 
No policing 
missions 
Discussion 
regarding 
possibility of future 
peacekeeping 
missions 
 
Japanese 
government offered 
cooperation with 
peacekeeping 
training centers 
 
Disaster relief: 
Discussion of 
improved military-
to-military & 
civilian-military 
Need to move 
beyond dialogue 
 
Norm of non-
interference is 
obstacle when it 
comes to 
implementation of 
measures 
 
Counter-terrorism: 
still in phase of 
exploring ways to 
implement 
recommendations 
 
No actual 
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coordination, joint 
training & info 
sharing 
But, SOPs must 
acknowledge 
primacy of 
sovereignty 
 
Assistance only 
with consent of 
affected country 
 
Need for greater 
institutionalization; 
example: Regional 
Risk Reduction 
Center to collect 
data for early 
warning system 
 
implementation 
 
Hesitant to bring 
about permanent 
mechanisms like 
“Asiapol” for fear 
they could 
undermine 
“ASEAN way” 
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Abbreviations 
 
 
APEC     Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
ARF      ASEAN Regional Forum 
ASEAN    Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
ASEM     Asia-Europe Meeting 
ASA      Association of Southeast Asia 
ASPAC    Asian Pacific Council 
CBM      Confidence Building Mechanism 
CEPT      Common Effective Preferential Tariff 
CSCA     Conference on Security and Cooperation in Asia 
CSCAP    Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific 
CSCE      Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
ECSC      European Coal and Steel Community 
HADRSOP  Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Standard Operating 
Procedure 
ISG      Inter-Sessional Support Group 
ISM      Inter-Sessional Meeting 
MAPHILINDO  Grouping of Malaysia, Philippines and Indonesia 
NATO     North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NEACD    Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue 
PD      Preventive Diplomacy 
SEATO    Southeast Asia Treaty Organization 
SEANWFZ    Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone 
SOM      Senior Officers Meeting 
SOP      Standard Operating Procedure 
TAC      Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia 
ZOPFAN    Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality 
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